Water utility cybersecurity at an unattended pump station starts with four basics: keep controllers and remote terminal units (RTUs) off the public internet, replace every default password, keep an inventory of what is connected, and protect the link the station reports over. The first three are among the top cyber actions US agencies list for water systems.
Pump stations are where office security advice stops fitting. Nobody is on site to notice a strange login, and the only path out may be a cellular router in the cabinet.
How are water utilities hacked?
Two documents published by US agencies show ordinary openings at water sites: controllers reachable from the internet with a default password or none, shared logins, and former staff who kept their access.
A joint advisory from US and allied cyber agencies, AA23-335A, describes attackers who, beginning on 22 November 2023, reached programmable logic controllers (PLCs) at multiple US water and wastewater facilities. They logged in to internet-connected devices that had a default password or no password, and put a defacement message on the operator screen.
EPA’s enforcement alert of May 2024 reports that over 70% of the systems it had inspected since September 2023 violated basic requirements of Section 1433 of the Safe Drinking Water Act. Some had not changed default passwords, used a single login for all staff, or had not restricted access by former employees.
How do you find exposed PLC and RTU devices?
List every device at the station and how each one can be reached from outside. The CISA, EPA and FBI fact sheet Top Cyber Actions for Securing Water Systems says to start with internet-connected devices and devices that cannot be operated by hand.
For each device, write down its address, the ports it answers on and who can reach them. A controller that speaks Modbus/TCP listens on port 502, and the protocol has no login or encryption of its own, so anyone who reaches that port can send it requests. Its secure variant, Modbus/TCP Security on port 802, adds Transport Layer Security (TLS) with certificates on both sides, on devices that implement it.
Inside the station, I would rather read the router’s connection table than run an aggressive scan against a controller that is running a pump. How to split that network into zones is in my post on IoT network segmentation for plants.
What should replace default passwords on field devices?
Every controller, operator panel and router needs its own strong password, and every person their own login. The same fact sheet calls for unique, strong passwords, multifactor authentication (MFA) where possible, and asking manufacturers to eliminate default passwords.
When five people share one account, the logs cannot tell them apart. I would keep a list of accounts per site and treat a departure as the trigger to change every secret that person knew.
Hermetry connects field devices to live dashboards, rules and alerts: IoT telemetry and SCADA in one platform. Device traffic is encrypted by default: MQTT runs over TLS on port 8883, and plain MQTT on port 1883 stays off unless you switch it on in a device profile. The checklist is on the device transport security page.
What can a small utility fix first?
This is the order I would work in at an unattended station:
- Take controllers and RTUs off public addresses, and reach them only through a VPN or gateway that asks for MFA.
- Change every default password, give each person their own account, and remove the access of people who have left.
- Back up controller programs and configurations, keep one copy off site, and test a restore.
- Test the incident response plan once a year, including who drives to the station.
None of this replaces the station’s local protections. Level switches, pump interlocks and manual control must keep working when the network is down. For the monitoring side, see monitoring for water networks and remote monitoring of pumping stations and reservoirs.
Frequently asked questions
What does advisory AA23-335A tell water utilities to change?
It asks operators to replace all default passwords on PLCs and HMIs with strong passwords, disconnect PLCs from the public-facing internet, disable remote programming of PLCs and use multifactor authentication. Where a PLC must be reached remotely, it puts a gateway, firewall or VPN in front of it.
Which US rule covers cybersecurity at drinking water systems?
Section 1433 of the Safe Drinking Water Act requires community water systems serving more than 3,300 people to conduct a risk and resilience assessment, develop an emergency response plan, certify both to EPA and review them every five years. EPA says these elements include cyber threats.
How should a pump station back up its controller programs?
The CISA, EPA and FBI fact sheet recommends regular, tested backups kept isolated from the network, and cites the NIST 3-2-1 rule: three copies, on two different media types, with one copy stored off site.

