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IEC 62443 explained for asset owners, integrators and device makers

IEC 62443 splits industrial security between the asset owner, the integrator and the product supplier. Here is which parts each of them reads, and why no single certificate makes a plant secure.

IEC 62443 is a series of standards for securing industrial automation and control systems (IACS). It splits the work between three roles: the asset owner who runs the plant, the service provider who integrates and maintains it, and the product supplier who builds the components. No single certificate covers all three.

The question I hear most is which certificate proves a device is secure. Explained role by role, the standard gives a more useful answer.

Who does IEC 62443 apply to?

It applies to everyone who owns, integrates, maintains or builds industrial control systems. The IEC and the ISA99 committee develop the series together, and the ISA overview of the series names asset owners, integrators, service providers and product suppliers among its audiences.

The parts come in four groups: 1-x concepts and terms, 2-x policies and procedures, 3-x the system, 4-x its components.

RoleRead firstWhat you produce
Asset owner2-1, 3-2A security program; zones, conduits and target levels
Integrator or maintenance provider2-4, 3-3 (and 3-2 with the owner)Its own security program; a design that meets the targets
Product supplier4-1, 4-2A secure development lifecycle; components with a stated capability

Which parts of IEC 62443 should an asset owner read?

Start with Part 2-1 and Part 3-2. Part 2-1 sets the requirements for the owner’s security program, and Part 3-2 describes the risk assessment that splits a system into zones and conduits and gives each a target security level.

A zone groups assets by risk, and conduits carry the communication between zones. If you run a water network or a factory, you are the asset owner, and you stay accountable for secure operation even when others do much of the work. I covered drawing those zones in IoT network segmentation for plants.

Part 3-2 leaves the risk method to you. Its outputs, the zone and conduit model, the risk assessments and the target levels, go into a cybersecurity requirements specification (CRS) for your integrators and suppliers.

What do integrators and device makers read?

Integrators read Part 2-4 for their own security program and Part 3-3 for system requirements at each security level. Product suppliers read Part 4-1, which covers a secure development lifecycle including threat modelling, and Part 4-2, which sets technical requirements for components: embedded devices, host devices, network devices and software applications.

Parts 3-3 and 4-2 organise their requirements under seven foundational requirements, from identification and authentication control to resource availability. In a design review I start with the plain questions: does each device have its own identity, such as a device certificate; does each account and process run with least privilege; and does an audit log show who changed what?

Is there a security certification for IoT devices?

Yes, but a certificate covers a capability or a process, never a whole plant. The IEC’s overview of IEC 62443 describes IECEE capability certification against Parts 2-4 and 4-1, and product certificates of conformity for control systems against Part 3-3 and for components against Part 4-2. For a single device, the Part 4-2 certificate is the one to ask for.

The series defines four security levels by the attacker they hold off:

LevelProtection against
SL 1Casual or coincidental violation
SL 2Intentional violation with simple means, low resources, generic skills and low motivation
SL 3Intentional violation with sophisticated means, moderate resources, IACS-specific skills and moderate motivation
SL 4Intentional violation with sophisticated means, extended resources, IACS-specific skills and high motivation

A capability level (SL-C) is what a component or system provides on its own. A target level (SL-T) comes out of the owner’s risk assessment. An achieved level (SL-A) is measured once the system is commissioned. A product certificate speaks to capability, SL-C; SL-A depends on how the parts were put together and how the plant is run.

A level is really a vector of seven values, one per foundational requirement, so I ask suppliers for the SL-C of each foundational requirement and compare it with the SL-T in my own CRS.

Frequently asked questions

Is ISA/IEC 62443 the same as IEC 62443?

Yes, it is one series. ISA publishes the parts as ISA-62443 standards through its ISA99 committee and submits them to the IEC for international adoption, so the same parts appear under both names.

Does IEC 62443 replace ISO/IEC 27001?

No. The IEC notes that IEC 62443 can be used together with the ISO/IEC 27000 series. You can run an information security management system for the business and apply IEC 62443 to the control systems, as long as the IACS security program is coordinated with the wider security policy.

Can old equipment meet IEC 62443?

Often not on its own. The series accepts that legacy systems cannot meet every requirement and lets a requirement be met directly or by a compensating countermeasure, such as placing an old controller in its own zone behind a conduit that limits what can reach it.

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