New: the AI firewall watches the whole platform and explains each incident in plain words. See how it works

Shared accounts in control rooms: why they persist and what to use instead

Wall screens, eight-hour shifts and emergencies keep shared logins alive. What NIST's OT guide allows, and how to keep a name on every action that changes the process.

Shared accounts in control rooms persist because the room needs screens that stay on, operators who can act at once, and shift changes without a sign-in ritual. Their cost is that no action carries a name. Replace them with view-only screens that need no personal account, and personal accounts for anything that changes the process.

NIST’s guide to OT security, SP 800-82 Rev. 3, says shared credentials are often used on OT systems. It treats them as something to control where they cannot be removed yet, which is how I treat them too.

Why are shared passwords a security risk?

A shared password removes the name from every action and cannot be taken back from one person. NIST says shared credentials limit the ability to positively identify the individual person, process or device that accessed a protected resource, and that anomalous behaviour on shared accounts may be harder to detect.

When someone leaves the team, the only way to lock them out is to change the password for every shift, and NIST lists passwords that are shared and not changed frequently among the weaknesses of password authentication. It also warns that systems are often delivered with default passwords that can be easily guessed. A shared login that is still the delivered default is the worst case of all.

Why do shared accounts persist in control rooms?

Because they solve real problems. A wall screen has nobody to sign in, a shift may change every eight hours, and an operator facing an upset has no time to type a password.

NIST accepts the last point. In its OT discussion of identification and authentication, it says local emergency actions are not hampered by identification or authentication requirements, and that where shared accounts are required, compensating controls include more physical security, personnel security and auditing. For remote access it is stricter: the remote access mechanism should identify, permit and log the individual before a shared account is used. A shared login reachable from outside the plant is the one I would remove first.

How do you show a dashboard on a screen without logging in?

Give the screen its own view-only access instead of leaving an operator’s session open on it. A screen that can show data but cannot send anything needs no personal account, and an open operator session on a wall is a shared account under another name.

Hermetry connects field devices to live dashboards, rules and alerts: IoT telemetry and SCADA in one platform. For wall screens it has display links: a link that shows one shared board on a screen without a sign-in, created per screen, expiring after 1 to 365 days and revocable at once. On the screen, controls are inactive and nothing can be changed or sent, and the link never acts with more rights than the member who created it has now. Stopping one screen does not touch the others.

How do you keep accountability across shifts?

Make every action that changes the process happen under a personal account: acknowledging an alarm, sending a command, changing a setpoint. Watching can stay anonymous on a display; operating and changing cannot (more on who may watch, who may operate, who may change).

At handover, the outgoing operator signs out and the incoming one signs in, so the record shows who acknowledged what and when. That record is your audit trail. Personal accounts only hold if signing in is quick, so I would spend effort there before writing another password policy. Devices need the same treatment as people; shared device passwords stop scaling for the same reasons.

Frequently asked questions

What if an old HMI supports only one login?

Then control the room instead of the account. NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3 says that for local access, physical access controls and logging may be used as an alternative to individual authentication. In practice that means a console only shift staff can reach and a shift log with names and times, so any action can be tied to a person.

Is using a colleague’s open session a problem?

Yes. Every action in that session is recorded under the colleague’s name, so the record names the wrong person and the colleague answers for it. Lock or sign out of a session when you step away or hand over, and make your own sign-in fast enough that borrowing is never the easier option.

Should a control room use multi-factor authentication?

For remote access, yes. NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3 gives the example that remote access to the OT environment may require multi-factor authentication while local access may require only a user ID and password, because physical access controls protect the area where that password can be used.

Share

See your field data live this week

Start a trial in your region with your first devices, or book a demo and bring your own use case.